The capacity and commitment of Uganda to govern its oil in developmental ways has generally been discussed through a new institutionalist prism that focuses on the dangers of the 'resource curse'. This paper argues that the developmental potential of oil in Uganda can be better understood through a political settlements framework which goes beyond a focus on institutional form to examine how deeper forms of power and politics shape oil governance. Drawing on in-depth primary research, we focus in particular on the extent to which the interplay of interests and ideas within Uganda's ruling coalition has enabled the government to protect its national interest during negotiations with international oil companies. However, the dynamics of Uganda's political settlement raise serious doubts as to whether the impressive levels of elite commitment and bureaucratic capacity displayed to date will withstand the intensifying pressures that will accompany the eventual commencement of oil flows.
Understanding the politics of oil in Africa: beyond the resource curse
MOST ANALYSES OF AFRICA'S NATURAL RESOURCE boom have tended to focus on whether countries will be able to avoid the economic and political dimensions of the 'resource curse', 1 including the contracting of 'Dutch disease' and the apparent tendency of oil wealth to support patronage-based and undemocratic forms of rule. Inspired mainly by the new institutionalist thinking that underpinned the 'good governance' agenda within international development, such lines of enquiry tend to produce standard recipes for how countries can avoid the resource curse, particularly in terms of adopting best-practice-type institutions of the kind that have been seen to work well in more democratic countries. The same tendency is apparent within recent studies of oil in Uganda. 2 We argue that it might be more useful to avoid according 'oil' a specific sense of political agency that is somehow independent of contextual factors 3 and go beyond an obsession with institutional form to focus instead on the deeper forms of politics and power relations that underpin institutional performance. The value of this approach to understanding the politics of natural resource governance in Africa has already been demonstrated by Amy Poteete, whose research challenges the mainstream argument that Botswana has been largely able to avoid the resource curse regarding its diamond wealth due to the character of the country's institutional arrangements. 4 Poteete argues that 'Behind policies, institutions, and state coalition are more likely to be aligned with growth and development'. 9 However, if they are strong, this is likely to reduce the time horizons of the ruling coalition and incentivise shortterm moves to retain power. In terms of vertical inclusion, 'The greater the relative power of higher over lower levels within the ruling coalition, the greater the implementation and enforcement capacities of the coalition' 10 . This flows from 'the pyramidal structure of patronclient organizations' which means that 'the more powerful lower level factions become, the greater the number of points at which the enforcement of particular rules can be blocked.' As such, the highest levels of state capacity for development should be found where there are weak levels of horizontal and vertical power in relation to the ruling coalition.
As we show below, this form of analysis is particularly helpful for generating insights into the ways in which the underlying configuration of power shapes the national-level incentives to which political elites respond when it comes to governing resources. However, this perspective tends to underplay at least two other forms and dimensions of politics that are significant in shaping the developmental capacity and commitment of governments, namely:
the role of transnational and local as well as national actors within African politics and policy processes; and the extent to which ideas as well as incentives can shape political behaviour.
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As Michael Watts 12 has shown, these dimensions are particularly important in shaping oil governance, whereby the presence of abundant natural resources leads to new sets of governance relationships between actors at multiple scales, in ways which actively reshape the political imaginaries of elite and popular actors alike, particularly around notions of 9 Khan, 'Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing institutions',p. 64. 10 Khan, 'Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing institutions',p. 'modernity', 'development' and 'sovereignty'. 13 Watts shows how these relationships and flows coalesce around 'a regime of accumulation and a mode of regulation', which involves 'a variety of actors, agents, and processes that give shape to our contemporary iteration of hydrocarbon capitalism' 14 . This involves intense processes of coalition-building and negotiation amongst and between major oil companies, politicians, technocrats, oil communities, the military and civil society organisations, in ways that we argue reflects and reshapes both the broader political settlement and political ideas around sovereignty, rights and development. This need to emphasise the role of ideas and the spatiality of governance arrangements involved in struggles over natural resource governance 15 resonates strongly with recent work on the 'negotiated' character of statehood in Africa, 16 whereby both longterm processes of state formation and everyday governance processes in Africa are intensely transnationalised and localised, and involve discursive as well as material efforts to build legitimacy for specific political projects.
This literature provides a strong rationale for exploring the ways in which the political settlement and dominant ideas shape the governance of oil over multiple scales, and in doing so recasting debates over oil in Africa in relation to deeper forms of politics and power relations than tend to occur within contemporary debates over 'good governance'. We make this argument by first setting out in the next section the interplay of incentives and ideas which we take to constitute Uganda's specific type of broad political settlement . Using
Khan's framework, we show that Uganda can be characterised as having moved from a potentially developmental coalition from when the Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance re-instated multi-party elections, this move has generally weakened the capacity and commitment of the ruling coalition to delivering development other than through largely clientelist measures. It is within this context that Uganda discovered commercial quantities of oil in 2006, as we set out in our review of the country's oil sector, which includes a focus on the key players involved in its governance, namely the most powerful actors within the ruling coalition such as the president and a chosen few from the inner circle. .
Using a process-tracing method that draws on insider accounts of the process through which contracts and agreements have been drawn up between the government and oil companies, 17 we are able to trace the direct role that these leading actors played in securing particular deals, and locate both this and the outcomes of negotiations to the broader incentives and ideas that prevail in Uganda's political settlement. More specifically, we show that the investments that President Museveni made in developing bureaucratic capacity within the oil sector during the dominant developmental period have strongly increased the government's bargaining power vis-à-vis international oil companies. Our evidence that the president has both supported technocrats in this and taken a direct and influential role in ensuring that negotiations led to deals which seem favourable to Uganda's national interest, reflects a sense in which the potential of oil wealth and related investments (as predicted by Watts), along with a desire to secure a lasting legacy beyond his rule, have apparently rejuvenated his ideological commitment to promoting a particular form of development in Uganda.
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However, we suggest that the tendencies generated by Uganda's now 'weak dominant' form of political settlement, along with Museveni's wider geopolitical manoeuvring, strongly reduce the likelihood that the developmental capacity and commitment that has enabled Uganda to secure good deals with oil companies will be maintained once oil actually starts to flow.
Our evidence is drawn from interviews with key players within Uganda's oil assemblage, including politicians, bureaucrats, oil company representatives, foreign advisors and civil society actors, as well as documentary evidence. We were particularly fortunate in gaining access to senior actors directly involved in negotiations from both government and oil companies, as well as to insider documentation concerning the otherwise highly secretive negotiations. Names are not used and direct quotations are attributed in a general manner intended to prevent the identification of sources. We have been able to triangulate all of our key findings, both in terms of data from different types of source (interviews, official documentation, secondary material, media reports) and in terms of interviewees from agencies with different interests and perspectives on the processes described here. Our account has also been shared with, and affirmed as accurate by, some of the main actors involved. Data was collected during a series of research trips to Uganda over 2013 and 2014
by the first author and over a longer and more sustained period by the second.
18 A focus on achieving the 'structural transformation' of Uganda's economy has formed a key element of Museveni's political pronouncements on development, as with the NRM's Fifteen Point Plan and successive Manifestos, and also his government's development policies, as with the first Pillar of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (1997) and the more recent National Development Plan (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) Museveni returning to his long-standing ideological attachment to development as a process of structural transformation.
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In sum, Uganda's shift from a largely 'developmental coalition' to a 'weak dominant party' political settlement has generally weakened its capacity and commitment to delivering development, particularly in terms of the increasingly short-term pressures being exerted on the ruling coalition and the capacity of bureaucratic agencies to perform their roles effectively. Although this would seem to augur badly for the developmental prospects of oil, there are also signs that the presence of oil has re-ignited a nationalist desire to promote development, within a new configuration of relations between national and transnational actors, and also between political and bureaucratic actors. The aim of this paper is to explore more closely how the interplay of these different incentives and ideas within Uganda has shaped the governance of oil to date.
The oil sector in Uganda
Although oil was identified within Uganda in the 1920s, it was not until 2006 that major deposits were discovered. Uganda's estimated petroleum reserve capacity is currently 6.5 billion barrels, of which 1.4 billion barrels are projected to be recoverable. 34 Current supplies are expected to be exhausted by around 2040, although as these estimates are based on an exploration of less than 40 percent of the Albertine Graben, this may increase further. 35 The blocks in the Albertine Graben in western Uganda were initially jointly licensed to AngloCanadian, Heritage Oil and the Anglo-Irish company, Tullow Oil. Heritage sold their stake to Tullow for US$ 1.5 billion, after which Tullow brought in investment from two bigger players, Total and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), each of which agreed in 2011 to pay $ 1.45bn to split the area three ways. 36 Of the ten exploration areas in the Albertine Graben, the government has licensed five of them to oil exploration 34 From an article on PEPD website, 'Uganda's petroleum resources increase to 6.5 billion barrels oil in place', Oil is unlikely to start flowing in Uganda until around 2018. Original estimates suggested that if is extracted at its estimated peak of over 100,000 barrels per day at current prices, 'revenues are likely to be in the order of US$2 billion per year (around 12 percent of GDP)' 40 although such estimates have since been downgraded to around 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Whilst this remains a significant contribution to the country's finances, and could potentially replace a good deal of aid money (currently around 11 percent of GDP), it seems unlikely that Uganda will be reconstituted as a new petro-state along the lines of Nigeria (which has 37 billion barrels) or even Angola (with nearly 8 billion barrels of recoverable oil).
The key actors within Uganda's oil sector comprise the president and some military leaders, various government agencies, international oil companies, international donor agencies, parliament and civil society (see Figure 1) . The relative power of these actors vis-à-vis the ruling coalition helps explain the nature of negotiations over oil governance in Uganda to date, as discussed below. Unsurprisingly, the president has played a key role in all dimensions of oil governance to date, from identifying suitable partners to work with and negotiating contracts with them to setting out a strategy for distributing oil revenue. 
The political settlement and the governance of oil in Uganda
There is clear evidence that the governance of oil in Uganda to date has reflected the least democratic and developmental tendencies that emanate from its political settlement. This is 41 Adapted from Watts' notion of the 'oil assemblage', 'Antinomies of community'. reflects the predictions of political settlements analysis, which takes it as axiomatic that powerful actors within the ruling coalition will seek to ensure that institutions distribute resources in their interest, and which would further predict that political space would be foreclosed within 'dominant party' settlements.
International support institutes
However, we also find compelling evidence that Uganda has displayed relatively high levels of state capacity and elite commitment to govern oil in the national interest. This is particularly apparent in terms of its systematic efforts to explore, map and market its oil from the late 1980s onwards and, above all, the securing of deals with reputable oil companies that seem to be more advantageous to government than many others signed in Africa. We argue 45 Africa Confidential, 'Museveni gets his refinery', 6 March 2015. 46 The main case involved charges of corruption made in 2011 against the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the then Prime Minister and Minister of Energy, all powerful players both within the ruling coalition and with regards oil negotiations. All were subsequently cleared by a parliamentary investigation, although a minority report argued that the investigation was compromised by the fact that it did not uncover any new data, but relied instead on evidence generated by the same ministries under the control of those charged; see Cecilia Ogwal, 'Minority report regarding the Parliamentary Ad-hoc Committee on the regularization of the oil and gas sector', Kampala, 2013, mimeo. 47 De Vibe, 'Political economy analysis of the oil sector in Uganda'.
here that these achievements directly reflect the broadly dominant leader form of political settlement in Uganda, in terms of the space this offers for longer-term vision to emerge and be pursued, and also a concerted effort to overcome some of the pressures that the settlement is under in both horizontal and vertical directions. As discussed below, the key strategies employed by Museveni have involved a deliberate centralisation of access to oil-related rents, the protection and promotion of state capacity within the oil sector of the civil service, and an apparent reluctance to play to lower-level factions in terms of promising a populist redistribution of oil wealth via social expenditures.
Nonetheless, it is important not to over-state these positive findings, which are specific to a particular set of relationships and arrangements within a key part of the oil assemblage.
Given the political settlement tendencies identified above, whereby since establishing its commitment and capacity to governing oil in the national interest during its 'dominant developmental' phase, the country has since shifted to a 'weak dominant' form of political settlement, and the fact that Uganda has yet to experience the challenge of actually managing and distributing flows of oil wealth, it would be unwise to predict too positive a future for oil governance in Uganda.
Negotiating with oil companies
The capacity of African governments to secure good deals with international oil companies (IOCs) is a central feature of ensuring that the developmental benefits of oil are realised. In
Uganda, most such negotiations have taken place at State House and involved only powerful players from the president's inner circle and selected players from the oil assemblage. By 2013, the range of those involved had narrowed further as a result of two corruption scandals, the first involving charges that cabinet ministers involved in negotiations were involved in taking bribes from oil companies, as mentioned above. 48 The second case involved two Chinese companies allegedly bribing senior public officials and family members of the ruling coalition in pursuit of the contract for constructing Karuma dam, Uganda's largest hydropower project. Once this bidding war became public knowledge and was subject to investigation by the inspector general of government, both the president and Chinese ambassador took steps to rein in the actors involved. According to one observer of energy politics in Uganda:
…the Chinese ambassador called a time out, and set down rules for how their companies should operate, to determine which firms would be able to bid where there was competition.
So one got Karuma the other got Simba: this was possible because of the control exerted over government-owned companies…their (the Embassy's) anger was around how the process had been discredited and got too public. There has now been a retraction and a change in operating style. They now get ground rules in place first. Less public. The
Ambassador is the official clearing house for deals.
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After this episode, one Chinese embassy official stated that from now on 'we deal only with the president'. Likewise, the president has sought to cut out the type of 'middle-men' involved in this episode, with only one close family member now empowered to explore options with different companies in advance and a smaller ministerial team involved in oil negotiations. This approach, which has involved excluding some of the elites named in the corruption scandal referred to above, reflects an effort to centralise rent-seeking that has been depth through a detailed account of the process through which the current MoU was established.
Towards a Memorandum of Understanding: debating the refinery and international arbitration
The current MoU establishes the terms of engagement between government and the oil companies regarding the roadmap for the commercialisation of petroleum resources.
Eventually signed in February 2014, the negotiation process was a highly conflictual one that spanned over a year. The main points of contention centred on three issues, namely the oil refinery, the use of international arbitration and the process for approving the field development plans of the IOCs.
The first issue concerned government's desire to establish an increasingly large oil refinery, which would have first call on oil once it starts flowing from the currently contracted areas.
This plan reflects GoU's desire to add value to its oil locally before exporting it in crude form, including through the manufacturing of petroleum-related products both for domestic consumption and export within the region. The president has repeatedly identified the proposed refinery as a means of avoiding Dutch disease effects and supports the country's wider project of securing socio-economic transformation. 53 The proposal is inscribed in the 53 See numerous press reports, including Museveni's argument made during negotiations over the MoU that a refinery should take precedence over a pipeline because 'Time has come, therefore, for our region to coordinate policies that will optimise the use of our natural resources and make efficient use of their exploitation for the transformation of our communities', Mary Karugaba, 'Museveni blasts oil companies over refinery', The New Vision, 10 April 2013, http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/641544-museveni-blasts-oil-companies-overrefinery.html. ( 28 October 2015).
dispute during the 2013-14 negotiations was not about the establishment of the refinery per se: as one oil company representative told us, 'The refinery was a political issue: we never questioned that it was significant and strategic for the country, we questioned the size of the refinery'. 54 The government wished to start with a 20 thousand barrels per day (kbpd) refinery, before expanding its capacity to 60 kbpd, later to 120kbpd and 180 kbpd to meet domestic and regional demand for petroleum products. It also insisted that the refinery must be serviced before other export options would be considered, most notably via the pipeline.
According to a government source, this position was communicated to industry in the minister's letter of 27 January 2012, immediately prior to the new PSAs being signed in February 2012. 55 The IOCs were wary of a large refinery, as their preference was to export the oil as swiftly as possible via a pipeline to the Kenyan coast, and they were concerned that there would be insufficient reserves left for export once the refinery had been serviced. They also sought a commitment from GoU that companies gaining licences to exploit oil from new fields would also be responsible for supplying the refinery: as one oil company source noted whilst the negotiations were ongoing, '…we disagree around who should supply the oil to the refinery: we want to de-risk our relationship with it by sharing our supply contribution to refinery with those (IOCs) coming in next phase.'
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The second main point of contention concerned the insistence by IOCs that international arbitration be made available within the MoU as a means of settling disputes between the government and themselves. The IOCs were insistent that this was a norm within the industry and was essential to protect both their interests and rights over property gained through the 54 Interview, oil company representative, Kampala, June 2014. 55 Interview, government official, Kampala, June 2014. 56 Interview, oil company source, Kampala, November 2013.
production-sharing agreements. 57 GoU was reluctant to accede, having been made keenly aware of the spiralling costs that arbitration can involve through its long-running struggle with Heritage concerning who was responsible for paying the tax associated with the sale of Heritage assets to Tullow. The final, and arguably less controversial, point of contention concerned the preference of IOCs for a 'basin-wide' approach to the production phase, whereby all plans and projects (including the refinery and the pipeline) would be approved and operationalised in an integrated way to achieve economies of scale. GoU was opposed to this, as it wanted to ensure that oil could start flowing for energy projects and the refinery as soon as possible and did not want delays in one area to hold up progress in others.
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Negotiating the Memorandum of Understanding
Official discussions around the Memorandum of Understanding began in early 2013. By March 2013 the government had produced a draft MoU, which the president ordered to be signed by 11 April. The second page of the draft justifies plans for a refinery with reference to the existing PSA with Tullow, and also the agreement to allow partners to construct a crude oil export pipeline. 60 . Clause 4.1 stresses that the refinery will be developed in two phases, to 30kbpd and then to 60kbpd, and will continue to have first call on oil even if expanded further. On 17 April Tullow wrote to MEMD accepting the refinery, but demanding that it be small in size and permitted to grow beyond 30kbpd only if Uganda could prove that it has the market demand for extra supply. 61 In response, PEPD cited a report that they had commissioned from the Norwegian consultancy agency, Foster Wheeler, which argued that the refinery was much more cost-effective and economically productive for
Uganda than a crude-export pipeline, and noted that as Uganda could produce 180-220kbpd, there would be enough oil left to export after the refinery had taken its share. and also dismissed the use of international arbitration as a means to resolve disputes. 66 GoU described the IOC insistence that future licensees contribute to the refinery as 'unacceptable', although the wording within the revised draft was changed to allow that this 'may be' the case. A similar position was taken with regards the issue of integrated development plans, whereby '…His Excellency (the president) guided that wording be included in the MoU to recognise the need for integrated planning of the fields and projects including other licensees', without actually committing to this. 67 Finally, GoU threatened to stop discussing the MoU unless partners agreed to these terms, and reminded the oil companies that GoU had already made significant concessions regarding the reduction of the proposed scale of refinery from its original 190kbpd. 68 GoU had stopped referring to the larger refinery under pressure from the IOCs who complained that the Foster-Wheeler Report's advocacy of an 180kbpd refinery 'was nonsense'. According to one oil company source, 'We told them we did not agree. Given our industry experience, we had to fight this report. We produced our views our figures our economics, so many workshops, etc., to try and convince, took a year!' (Interview with oil company source, Kampala, June 2014).
wrong impression created by this letter'. 69 With reference to the new Clause 4.5 inserted by oil companies, such that 'production from future licencees areas to contribute to the 60kbpd refinery on a pro-rata basis', the minister wrote that: 'This is not agreeable, MoU is based on production of the resources currently established in contract areas and it is wrong to bind future licensees in an agreement to which they are not party'. 70 The minister again noted that 'His Excellency' had guided in the meeting of 20 May that the MoU include wording which allows for the linking of refinery supply to later fields, without making this compulsory. The minister also reiterated that, even when the refinery expanded beyond 60kbpd, it should have first call on any additional reserves in the contract areas, once demand is confirmed. The final point of contention was around dispute resolution, with the minister once again stating that it is wrong to solve by arbitration as there are 'too many unknown variables' in such processes.
The letter concluded with: '…before going back to the president, it is important that these differences are streamlined.'
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By the time the oil companies met with the minister of energy on 23 October they had accepted both scale of the refinery and the government's rejection of the necessity of a basinwide approach. As one government representative put it: 'They saw we wouldn't move.
PEPD proved that we could consume the 30kbpd. We stuck to our guns.' 72 When negotiations continued at a meeting between the companies and the president on 1 December 2013, with a follow-up the next day involving the attorney general, it was the issue of international arbitration that remained as the main sticking point. 73 On 16 January 2014, We had hit a dead-end around the arbitration clause. Members did not want international arbitration regarding the Heritage-Tullow case, also another one with Tullow. Somehow the president remained behind, and greeted and talked to these lawyers (for Tullow and Total). As we were getting out of State House, he called us back and said I have been talking to these young girls (the lawyers), they seem to have convinced me (parentheses added).
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The lawyers had suggested differentiating between disputes over legal matters, which could be dealt with locally, and disputes over the terms of the actual contract, which could be sent for international arbitration. This would allow the country would retain all sovereignty over laws, whilst the company could protect itself with regards its contracts. According to the same source, 'She split it so well, the president was convinced and no-one said anything.
Then we agreed to come back in a few days and sign … the solicitor general was also asked to give an opinion. congratulated the parties and thanked the oil companies for agreeing to terms of MoU and their support for Uganda's transformation process.
Commitment and capacity within Uganda's weak dominant party settlement
The government (of Uganda) has good, well trained civil servants, good external support and a president who has been very strong, very patriotic. However, the government was less successful around dispute resolution, with IOCs securing the option of using international arbitration should there be a dispute over contracts. This is partly explained by the fact that GoU never articulated its opposition to international arbitration as clearly and credibly as it did concerning the refinery, whereas the IOCs 77 Interview with oil industry source, Entebbe, 7 November 2013
presented evidence on such a mechanism being an industry norm and pursued it aggressively as a red line. This suggests that the capacities of African governments to pursue 'economic nationalism' remains constrained by the rights of global capital to protect their deals, 78 particularly their acquisition of property rights, but also reflects the president's wider, somewhat confused ideological orientation, which incorporates elements of both economic nationalism and neoliberalism. 79 Here, the president emerges as a balancing force in the discussions, offering concessions to the oil companies at certain stages in recognition of their motivations:
…he would listen to each side, he would moderate it very well. These are people who also have direct access to the president, he is very interested in investors from around the world. He does not want to be so hard on them, and on the other hand he does not want the country to be taken for a ride or to be exploited in his words.
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The president was critical throughout the process, frequently intervening in meetings and forming a constant reference point in the official communications between MEMD and the oil companies. According to an oil company source present at meetings, He took real interest in the negotiations. Never have they (oil company colleagues) seen negotiations which involved a president sitting in negotiations around an MoU for ten hours, it has never happened. He has been involved very directly and personally in negotiations, because it is a key issue for the country, as he considers it.
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Museveni's involvement gave extra weight and credibility to the positions being taken by The oil companies seemed surprised by the level of capacity and commitment exhibited by the government in the negotiations. According to one government participant, '…they (the IOCs) have been around the world and Africa, they said they have never had this kind of resistance and challenge… (the IOCs) present these things and governments accept.' 83 The president and PEPD were critical in this process. One oil company representative noted that:
'PEPD is definitely the agency that is running the oil business' in Uganda, 84 and was able to negotiate so strongly not only because of their in-depth knowledge of the sector and having highly-trained staff, but also because they received the strong support of the president. 85 In nurturing high levels of state capacity to govern oil, the president seems to have been driven by a combination of political interests and ideological commitments to promoting a more muscular project of structural transformation in Uganda. As one media observer of the oil and energy sectors notes, the president seems to see oil governance as a 'nationalist cause'. 86 Any analysis of how the incentives generated by the political settlement shape the governance of oil in Uganda therefore needs to be complemented by an examination of the role of ideational factors, particularly with regards to the apparent high level of presidential commitment to securing deals with oil companies that are more obviously weighted in the national interest than in any apparent desire to sign market-friendly deals as a faster route to securing rent-seeking opportunities.
Events flowing from the MoU, particularly regarding the bidding process for rights to construct the refinery on the shores of Lake Albert, further underline the relevance of adopting a transnationally-informed approach to political settlements analysis to understand oil governance in contemporary African states. The eventual decision to award the $4bn contract to Russian state company, RT-Global Resources, was closely informed both by intraelite struggles within Uganda's ruling coalition and Museveni's wider geopolitical and security ambitions. The eventual short-list for the contracting process included a company from South Korea, as well as the eventual winner from Russia. Surprisingly, it ruled out any contenders from China, despite the country's strong existing interests in Uganda's oil sector.
According to one report, 
Conclusion
The governance of oil in Uganda to date, particularly in terms of the government's capacity and commitment to conducting relatively successful 'upstream' negotiations with international oil companies, can be most usefully understood in relation to the incentives and ideas that flow from its particular type of political settlement, as located within the broader transnational context that pervades both the oil sector and African statehood more broadly.
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Despite some evidence that oil is tending to reflect and further deepen what might be characterised as regressive features of Uganda's political settlement, including the repression of dissent and militarisation, the same political settlement has helped create the conditions for a relatively high level of capacity and commitment to managing oil (at this stage at least) in the national interest. Some of these tendencies overlap, as with the high levels of presidential control, which both foreclose greater openness and are directly associated with securing good deals. To the extent that oil appears to have re-engaged Museveni's interest in a more ambitious project of development as modernisation and structural transformation, this opens at least the possibility that he will use the power afforded to him within Uganda's ruling coalition to ensure that oil is governed in the national interest.
Whereas the main dynamics within Uganda's political settlement, which we characterise here as having shifted from a 'potentially developmental' (from 1986 when investments in 88 Africa Confidential, 'Museveni gets his refinery'. 89 Watts, 'A tale of two Gulfs'; Hagmann and Peclard, 'Negotiating statehood'.
state capacity in the oil sector were first made) to a 'weak dominant' form from around 2000, are tending to undermine the developmental orientation and capacities of the ruling coalition, the president has deployed at least three strategic moves to countervail these tendencies, apparently driven by a genuine commitment to ensuring that oil wealth is used in line with his nationalist vision of development for Uganda. 90 These have involved efforts to control moves by other powerful members of the ruling coalition to extract rents from the oil sector and centralise such rent-seeking; enabling the development of high-level technical bureaucratic capacity within at least one mainstream government agency; and resisting the temptation to link incoming oil wealth to populist election pledges. Instead, he has repeatedly ear-marked oil revenue for investment in agriculture and infrastructural development. Taken together, these moves suggest possible routes through which even 'weakly dominant' coalitions can promote institution-building and development, when a leader is sufficiently dominant and committed.
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This apparent ideological commitment is neither entirely idealistic nor detached from the incentives flowing from the political settlement. The president is aware both that he has an increasingly expensive patronage machine to run, not least in the context of the forthcoming 2016 elections, but also regarding an apparent desire to leave a 'legacy' ahead of his potential departure from office after those elections. Centralising control over oil rents can help deliver both. Moreover, the success of these moves to date is linked to a particular 'upstream' level of oil governance, and may not be transferable further 'downstream: by their nature, negotiations over PSAs and MoUs involve high-level, secretive negotiations that demand levels of power and expertise that are monopolised by leading politicians, bureaucrats and capitalists, and which are thus easier to control. Where oil governance hits the ground, mainly 90 Hickey, 'Beyond the poverty agenda? 91 See also Khan, 'Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing institutions'.
in Western Uganda, it is notable that the Public Finance Bill adopted in November 2014 includes a promise to the resident Bunyoro kingdom that it will receive 7 percent of profits earned from oil underneath 'its' land. This suggests that the president's capacity to resist vertical demands from within the ruling coalition is weakened when it comes to securing the support of the rural base that is central to his continued hold on power. Whether such pressures are likely to increase when oil money actually starts to flow, remains to be seen, and may challenge the tentative suggestion here that oil may have helped re-catalyse developmental forms of governance in Uganda, not least as the deepening role of transnational capitalists is likely to further tip the balance towards the influence of rentier capital in ways that undermine Uganda's stated developmental ambitions. Given these pressures, it seems unlikely that the government will be able to continue moving against the grain of the country's political settlement dynamics for much longer.
